TaskQ is built around one hard boundary: customers reach the Gateway. Everything that executes work lives behind private planes, signed worker identity, key custody rules, and HashIQ evidence.
gateway.public : 443/customer-api relay.local : loopback or mesh queue.local : loopback or mesh registry.store : internal key-custody.service : policy-gated hashiq.writer : append-only settlement.writer : journal-only worker.heartbeat : signed worker.lease : signed + ttl
This is the difference between a gateway wrapper and a control plane: TaskQ separates public ingress, execution mechanics, custody, placement, proofs, and settlement.
Customer API · auth + entitlement · policy resolution · proof headers. The only door.
Placement solver · worker lease · BYOK handle resolution · HashIQ open/close · usage normalization · settlement journal.
Relay plane · Queue plane · registry store · key custody service · HashIQ writer · settlement writer.
Relay and Queue do not decide commercial policy. They do not accept public customer traffic. They execute only after the Gateway has authenticated, funded, placed, leased, and opened proof.
I1 : Gateway is the only public surface I2 : no request executes without customer auth I3 : hard constraints never relax I7 : every placement is replayable I10 : chain heads are externally anchored
Provider adapters execute requests. The registry owns worker state. Key custody owns decrypt policy. HashIQ owns signed evidence. Settlement owns chain-linked money movement.
| Service | Owns | Does not own |
|---|---|---|
| Gateway | auth / policy / placement | Does not execute model work directly. |
| Registry | workers / health / attestations | Does not fake compliance with dashboard labels. |
| Key custody | credential unwrap | Does not write plaintext secrets to chain or logs. |
| HashIQ writer | append-only proof | Does not store raw prompts or PHI by default. |
| Settlement writer | journal entries | Does not silently drop deferred settlement. |
When no compliant capacity exists, the correct output is not silent fallback. It is a signed refusal proof that shows the system protected the customer policy.
Empty eligible set, recorded with policy hash and registry snapshot.
Cheapest compliant worker exists, but exceeds the customer cost ceiling.
Request attempts to loosen hard defaults or create conflicting constraints.
Blocked, signed, exportable, replayable — a chain entry is still written.
The Gateway makes decisions. HashIQ makes those decisions replayable. External anchors make silent rewrites detectable. Export makes the evidence portable.
The control plane, verified worker registry, key custody model, HashIQ proof chain, and settlement ledger make every AI execution decision defensible.